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With commercialization and transformation taking place in the microfinance industry, the 
original mission of poverty alleviation may drift toward profit maximization. This thesis 
thus attempts to investigate the concern of mission drift in the member states of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and how they are influenced by various 
institutional and macro risk indicators. This quantitative research approach used a panel 
dataset of 5 years’ observation (2011-2015) of 57 MFIs of the OIC member countries. 
The ordinary least squares techniques with robust estimation to the general form of the 
cross sectional and temporal dependency was utilized. The evidence of this study should 
dispel the widely held apprehension of “mission drift”, rather it reveals that outreach to 
the lowest strata of poor can actually bolster the financial viability of MFIs. However, 
positive evidence of mission drift was identified for the regulated and matured MFIs. The 
results also indicate that non-bank financial institutions and non-governmental 
organizations have outperformed in social outreach than their counterparts. The findings 
show that network affiliation has a significant positive impact on the microfinance social 
mission. Furthermore, the study reveals mixed findings regarding the influence of 
institutional and macro risk indicators. Maturity, network affiliation and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth rate show greater influence than others on the relationship 
between the financial and social performances. The study supports the implication of the 
trade-off paradigm and the sustainability–driven scaling up approach. Hence, this 
research concludes that seeking financial sustainability does not necessarily harm the 
social mission, however, MFIs must find an equilibrium point of balancing their double 
bottom lines and continue the mission of poverty alleviation in microfinance operations. 
 





Dengan pengkomersialan dan transformasi yang berlaku dalam industri kewangan mikro 
ke arah, misi asal institusi kewangan mikro (MFI) khususnya untuk membasmi 
kemiskinan mungkin berganjak kepada memaksimakan keuntungan. Tesis ini oleh itu 
bertujuan untuk menyelidik perubahan misi di negara ahli dalam Pertubuhan Kerjasama 
Islam (OIC) dan bagaimana perubahan ini dipengaruhi oleh pelbagai faktor berkaitan 
institusi dan risiko makro. Kajian berbentuk kuantitatif ini mengguna pakai data panel, 
khususnya pemerhatian selama lima tahun (dari tahun 2011 hingga tahun 2015) terhadap 
57 MFI di negara-negara OIC. Teknik kuasa dua terkecil biasa dengan penganggar teguh, 
tinjauan umum keratan rentas serta temporal dependency telah digunapakai dalam kajian 
ini. Hasil kajian seharusnya melenyapkan kekhuatiran tentang perubahan misi dan 
memperlihatkan bahawa bantuan yang diberikan kepada golongan miskin yang tegar 
sebenarnya boleh memperkukuh prestasi kewangan MFI. Walaubagaimanapun, dapatan 
yang positif tentang perubahan misi telah dikenal pasti untuk MFI yang diregulasikan dan 
yang matang. Dapatan juga menunjukkan bahawa institusi kewangan bukan perbankan 
dan organisasi bukan kerajaan memberikan lebih banyak bantuan sosial berbanding 
dengan institusi kewangan perbankan dan agensi kerajaan. Gabungan jaringan juga 
didapati memberikan impak yang positif lagi signifikan terhadap misi sosial MFI. Selain 
itu, kajian ini juga memaparkan dapatan yang bercampur berhubung kesan petunjuk 
institusi dan risiko makro. Kematangan, gabungan jaringan dan kadar pertumbuhan 
produk dalam negara kasar (GDP) mempunyai pengaruh yang lebih besar berbanding 
dengan faktor lain terhadap hubungan antara prestasi kewangan dengan prestasi sosial. 
Kajian ini menyokong paradigma timbal balik dan pendekatan peningkatan yang memacu 
kelestarian. Oleh itu, kajian merumuskan bahawa usaha untuk mencapai kelestarian 
kewangan tidak semestinya mengganggu misi sosial. Walaubagaimanapun, MFI perlu 
mengenal pasti titik keseimbangan untuk mengimbangkan matlamat berganda mereka 
dan meneruskan misi membasmi kemiskinan dalam operasi kewangan mikro.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background of the Study 
The journey of microfinance commenced from an initiative of Mohammad Yunus in a 
small rural community of Bangladesh. Subsequently, he provided formal financial 
institution structure to microfinance while he founded the Grameen Bank in 1983. The 
prime objective of microfinance was to provide small scale loans to women of the rural 
society and educate them to participate in income generating activities. These initiatives 
of microfinance can reduce poverty, promote well-being and contribute in development. 
Therefore, it is often considered as one of the most widely used development tools in 
many developing societies (Ayele, 2015; Quayes & Khalily, 2014). 
 
However, Muhammad Yunus came up with the concept known as microcredit since at 
the beginning it was only providing small loans to the rural poor. Later microcredit 
extended its financial services and became more innovative in product development due 
to market demands (Chan & Lin, 2015; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2011) and 
eventually it has started recognizing as microfinance. This continuous development in 
microfinance industry had been only to achieve its prime objective of poverty reduction 
in different aspects (Chowdhury, 2009; Copestake, 2007). 
 
Notwithstanding, delivering micro loan in a very rural area to the extreme poor is neither 
easy task, nor inexpensive (Abate, Borzaga, & Getnet, 2014; Dehem & Hudon, 2013). 
The institutions can only hire self-motivated personnel for the work, but the deficit of 
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Estimations of the financial performance (dependent variable: OSS in Model 1, ROA in 
Model 2 and PM in Model 3) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
Regulated -0.055*** -0.013*** -0.011    
 (0.015) (0.003) (0.026)    
lnSize -0.006 0.003*** 0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)    
lnMaturity 0.142*** 0.025*** 0.027    
 (0.032) (0.003) (0.047)    
Bank 0.275*** 0.023 0.078**   
 (0.082) (0.015) (0.033)    
CUC 0.253*** 0.053*** 0.138*** 
 (0.061) (0.012) (0.038)    
NBFI 0.250*** 0.039*** 0.111*** 
 (0.064) (0.012) (0.032)    
NGO 0.345*** 0.043** 0.133**   
 (0.110) (0.017) (0.052)    
Network 0.391*** 0.066*** 0.086    
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.108)    
Inflation 0.005 0.001* -0.001    
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)    
GDP -0.001 -0.000 -0.000    
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)    
OE -2.985*** -0.492*** -2.245*** 
 (0.222) (0.018) (0.106)    
FE -4.288*** -0.370*** -1.944*** 
 (0.218) (0.053) (0.068)    
PAR -0.467** -0.104*** -0.345**   
 (0.231) (0.025) (0.139)    
Yield 1.954*** 0.371*** 1.476*** 
 (0.121) (0.017) (0.103)    
SSA -0.144*** -0.028*** -0.153*** 
 (0.048) (0.004) (0.038)    
EAP 0.253*** 0.033*** 0.035    
 (0.022) (0.009) (0.057)    
EECA 0.166*** 0.024** 0.042    
 (0.035) (0.011) (0.054)    
MENA -0.036 0.007 -0.025    




Table D-1 (Continued) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    
Constant 0.365*** -0.202*** -0.312    
 (0.098) (0.016) (0.195)    
    
R-squared 0.603 0.605 0.543    
Observation 285.000 285.000 285.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 




Estimations of the social performance (dependent variable: GNIALS in Model 4 and FFB 
in Model 5) 
Variable Model 4 Model 5    
 b/se b/se    
   
Regulated 0.055 -0.198*** 
 (0.035) (0.008)    
lnSize -0.010 0.007***  
 (0.008) (0.002)    
lnMaturity 0.070** -0.039*** 
 (0.035) (0.006)    
Bank 1.062*** 0.002    
 (0.107) (0.038)    
CUC 1.361*** -0.002    
 (0.217) (0.034)    
NBFI 0.685*** 0.188*** 
 (0.139) (0.015)    
NGO 0.404*** 0.219*** 
 (0.102) (0.030)    
Network 0.951*** 0.277*** 
 (0.097) (0.028)    
Inflation 0.038*** 0.011*** 
 (0.008) (0.002)    
GDP 0.052*** 0.003    
 (0.007) (0.002)    
BPSM -0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)    
CPB 0.003*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)    
SSA -0.348*** 0.036**   
 (0.046) (0.016)    
EAP -0.383*** 0.126***  
 (0.035) (0.041)    
EECA -0.545*** -0.190*** 
 (0.116) (0.040)    
MENA -0.175*** -0.236*** 
 (0.033) (0.014)    
Constant -1.623*** 0.344***  
 (0.267) (0.107)    
   
R-squared 0.677 0.667    
Observation 285.000 285.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 




Estimations of the mission drift (dependent variable: GNIALS) 
Variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS -0.955***                  
 (0.211)                  
ROA  -0.333***                 
  (0.045)                 
PM   -0.231*** 
   (0.038)    
Regulated 0.429*** 0.512*** 0.532*** 
 (0.024) (0.043) (0.033)    
lnSize -0.005 -0.068*** -0.038**   
 (0.006) (0.024) (0.016)    
lnMaturity 0.062** -0.116* -0.165**   
 (0.026) (0.059) (0.068)    
Bank 0.250 -0.259 -0.183    
 (0.197) (0.161) (0.202)    
CUC 0.473** -0.588 -0.277    
 (0.202) (0.600) (0.567)    
NBFI -0.475** -0.750*** -0.753***  
 (0.180) (0.178) (0.225)    
NGO -1.244*** -1.572*** -1.599*** 
 (0.230) (0.159) (0.205)    
Network -1.837*** -2.410*** -2.537*** 
 (0.055) (0.111) (0.119)    
Inflation 0.004 -0.008 -0.011    
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)    
GDP 0.105*** 0.090*** 0.097*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.018)    
SSA -0.603*** -0.287*** -0.364***  
 (0.083) (0.094) (0.110)    
EAP -2.634*** -2.757*** -2.945*** 
 (0.083) (0.227) (0.201)    
EECA 0.015 -0.149** -0.234***  
 (0.088) (0.063) (0.070)    
MENA -0.052 -0.101 -0.146    
 (0.112) (0.091) (0.093)    
Constant 0.686* 2.054*** 2.481*** 
 (0.371) (0.549) (0.587)    
    
R-squared 0.552 0.574 0.539    
Observation 285.000 241.000 244.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 




Estimations of the mission drift (dependent variable: FFB) 
Variable Model 9  Model 10 Model 11    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS 0.074**                  
 (0.030)                  
ROA  0.767***                 
  (0.090)                 
PM   0.095***  
   (0.034)    
Regulated -0.203*** -0.191*** -0.205*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)    
lnSize -0.010** -0.011** -0.012*    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)    
lnMaturity -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.027***  
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)    
Bank 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.163*** 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.014)    
CUC 0.152*** 0.142*** 0.157*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.022)    
NBFI 0.346*** 0.335*** 0.352*** 
 (0.032) (0.040) (0.026)    
NGO 0.423*** 0.405*** 0.430*** 
 (0.045) (0.052) (0.038)    
Network 0.480*** 0.429*** 0.488*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.025)    
Inflation 0.030** 0.027** 0.031***  
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)    
GDP 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)    
SSA 0.039 0.049 0.044    
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.041)    
EAP 0.186*** 0.155*** 0.190*** 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.041)    
EECA -0.315*** -0.329*** -0.312*** 
 (0.051) (0.043) (0.048)    
MENA -0.275*** -0.278*** -0.272*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)    
Constant 0.342* 0.415** 0.333**   
 (0.180) (0.171) (0.164)    
    
R-squared 0.548 0.557 0.548    
Observation 265.000 265.000 265.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 




Estimations of the mission drift and regulation status (dependent variable: GNIALS) 
Variable Model 12 Model 13 Model 14    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS -0.400***                  
 (0.100)                  
OSS*Regulated -0.477***                  
 (0.179)                  
ROA  -0.355***                 
  (0.069)                 
ROA*Regulated  1.277                 
  (1.782)                 
PM   -0.222*** 
   (0.055)    
PM*Regulated   0.011    
   (0.349)    
Regulated 0.446*** 0.050 0.125    
 (0.024) (0.119) (0.085)    
lnSize -0.009 0.019 0.043*    
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.022)    
lnMaturity 0.063** -0.026 -0.059**   
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.027)    
Bank 0.131 0.352** 0.462*** 
 (0.160) (0.132) (0.114)    
CUC 0.339 0.415 0.751**   
 (0.272) (0.381) (0.313)    
NBFI -0.596*** 0.092 0.127*    
 (0.151) (0.066) (0.066)    
NGO -1.370*** -0.535*** -0.508*** 
 (0.163) (0.129) (0.146)    
Network -1.935*** 0.210 0.127    
 (0.074) (0.164) (0.082)    
Inflation 0.004 0.191** 0.188***  
 (0.010) (0.075) (0.070)    
GDP 0.105*** 0.221*** 0.240*** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.026)    
SSA -0.615*** -0.172*** -0.250*** 
 (0.097) (0.056) (0.036)    
EAP -2.655*** -0.760*** -0.904*** 
 (0.079) (0.116) (0.135)    
EECA -0.013 0.043 -0.029    
 (0.098) (0.046) (0.041)    
MENA -0.065 0.188* 0.138    




Table D-5 (Continued) 
Variable Model 12 Model 13 Model 14    
Constant 1.871*** -1.639*** -1.185**   
 (0.643) (0.593) (0.565)    
    
R-squared 0.555 0.462 0.401    
Observation 285.000 226.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 






Estimations of the mission drift and regulation status (dependent variable: FFB) 
Variable Model 15 Model 16 Model 17    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS -0.167***                  
 (0.055)                  
OSS*Regulated 0.237***                  
 (0.078)                  
ROA  0.031*  
  (0.018)  
ROA*Regulated  0.277  
  (0.519)  
PM   0.042***  
   (0.013)    
PM*Regulated   -0.240*    
   (0.121)    
Regulated -0.212*** -0.216*** -0.173*** 
 (0.011) (0.034) (0.023)    
lnSize -0.012*** 0.008** -0.004    
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)    
lnMaturity -0.022*** 0.012 0.044***  
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.014)    
Bank 0.171*** 0.248*** 0.256*** 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.038)    
CUC 0.181*** 0.330*** 0.288*** 
 (0.062) (0.068) (0.072)    
NBFI 0.365*** 0.398*** 0.408*** 
 (0.040) (0.024) (0.031)    
NGO 0.457*** 0.481*** 0.502*** 
 (0.034) (0.008) (0.017)    
Network 0.560*** 0.562*** 0.628*** 
 (0.041) (0.025) (0.047)    
Inflation 0.011*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.013)    
GDP -0.002 0.035*** 0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)    
SSA 0.075*** 0.065** 0.073***  
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.026)    
EAP 0.226*** 0.236*** 0.281*** 
 (0.033) (0.067) (0.061)    
EECA -0.288*** -0.264*** -0.243*** 
 (0.027) (0.063) (0.065)    
MENA -0.274*** -0.226*** -0.216*** 




Table D-6 (Continued) 
Variable Model 15 Model 16 Model 17    
Constant 0.184** -0.244* -0.218    
 (0.074) (0.144) (0.158)    
    
R-squared 0.541 0.601 0.595    
Observation 285.000 226.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 




Estimations of mission drift and the size of MFIs (dependent variable: GNIALS) 
Variable Model 18 Model 19 Model 20    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS 0.808                  
 (0.543)                  
OSS*lnSize -1.412***                  
 (0.322)                  
ROA  -0.361***                 
  (0.060)                 
ROA*lnSize  0.049                 
  (0.074)                 
PM   -0.222*** 
   (0.055)    
PM*lnSize   0.001    
   (0.017)    
Regulated 0.469*** 0.130*** 0.127**   
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.057)    
lnSize -0.014* 0.001 0.043*    
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.022)    
lnMaturity 0.069* 0.017 -0.059**   
 (0.038) (0.028) (0.027)    
Bank 0.200 0.475*** 0.462*** 
 (0.153) (0.179) (0.114)    
CUC 0.427* 0.391 0.751**   
 (0.215) (0.436) (0.313)    
NBFI -0.519*** 0.222 0.127*    
 (0.168) (0.144) (0.066)    
NGO -1.298*** -0.452*** -0.508*** 
 (0.195) (0.129) (0.146)    
Network -1.861*** 0.136 0.127    
 (0.034) (0.155) (0.082)    
Inflation 0.032 0.138*** 0.188***  
 (0.023) (0.047) (0.070)    
GDP 0.108*** 0.066*** 0.240*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.026)    
SSA -0.463*** -0.134** -0.250*** 
 (0.071) (0.062) (0.036)    
EAP -2.639*** -0.759*** -0.904*** 
 (0.066) (0.094) (0.135)    
EECA 0.013 -0.016 -0.029    
 (0.091) (0.069) (0.041)    
MENA 0.006 0.220** 0.138    




Table D-7 (Continued) 
Variable Model 18 Model 19 Model 20    
Constant 2.200*** -1.433** -1.186**   
 (0.620) (0.688) (0.572)    
    
R-squared 0.560 0.452 0.401    
Observation 275.000 235.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 





Estimations of the mission drift and the size of MFIs (dependent variable: FFB) 
Variable Model 21 Model 22 Model 23    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS 0.245                  
 (0.195)                  
OSS*lnSize -0.135                  
 (0.139)                  
ROA  0.031*                 
  (0.018)                 
ROA*lnSize  0.014                 
  (0.026)                 
PM   0.042***  
   (0.013)    
PM*lnSize   -0.012*    
   (0.006)    
Regulated -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.215*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.010)    
lnSize -0.012** 0.007** -0.002    
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)    
lnMaturity -0.029*** 0.012 0.044***  
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.014)    
Bank 0.153*** 0.248*** 0.256*** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.038)    
CUC 0.142*** 0.330*** 0.288*** 
 (0.041) (0.068) (0.072)    
NBFI 0.341*** 0.398*** 0.408*** 
 (0.043) (0.024) (0.031)    
NGO 0.418*** 0.481*** 0.502*** 
 (0.057) (0.008) (0.017)    
Network 0.477*** 0.562*** 0.628*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.047)    
lnInflation 0.029** 0.062*** 0.064*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)    
lnGDP 0.021*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
SSA 0.045 0.065** 0.073***  
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.026)    
EAP 0.186*** 0.236*** 0.281*** 
 (0.045) (0.067) (0.061)    
EECA -0.317*** -0.264*** -0.243*** 
 (0.053) (0.063) (0.065)    
MENA -0.275*** -0.226*** -0.216*** 




Table D-8 (Continued) 
Variable Model 21 Model 22 Model 23    
Constant 0.496 -0.250* -0.207    
 (0.322) (0.149) (0.162)    
    
R-squared 0.548 0.601 0.595    
Observation 265.000 226.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 





Estimations of the mission drift and the maturity of MFIs (dependent variable: GNIALS) 
Variable Model 24 Model 25 Model 26    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS -1.087***                  
 (0.254)                  
OSS*lnMaturity 0.080**                  
 (0.033)                  
ROA  -0.409***                 
  (0.041)                 
ROA*lnMaturity  0.929***                 
  (0.202)                 
PM   -1.874**   
   (0.783)    
PM*lnMaturity   0.407*    
   (0.242)    
Regulated 0.055** 0.146*** 0.065**   
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.025)    
lnSize 0.047*** 0.008 0.061*** 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.006)    
lnMaturity 0.060 -0.057* 0.071    
 (0.078) (0.033) (0.077)    
Bank 0.818*** 0.425** 0.701*** 
 (0.135) (0.180) (0.166)    
CUC 1.035*** 0.373 0.975***  
 (0.257) (0.434) (0.293)    
NBFI 0.320** 0.201 0.248*    
 (0.122) (0.144) (0.145)    
NGO -0.303** -0.485*** -0.405***  
 (0.144) (0.128) (0.134)    
Network 0.443*** 0.048 0.363***  
 (0.117) (0.134) (0.123)    
Inflation 0.035*** 0.134*** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.044) (0.008)    
GDP 0.080*** 0.065*** 0.080*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)    
SSA -0.454*** -0.142** -0.426*** 
 (0.028) (0.064) (0.038)    
EAP -0.669*** -0.796*** -0.690*** 
 (0.053) (0.111) (0.062)    
EECA 0.099 -0.028 0.097    
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.061)    
MENA 0.200*** 0.219*** 0.205*** 




Table D-9 (Continued) 
Variable Model 24 Model 25 Model 26    
Constant -1.685*** -1.486** -1.616***  
 (0.524) (0.713) (0.549)    
    
R-squared 0.406 0.455 0.400    
Observation 285.000 235.000 285.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 





Estimations of the mission drift and the maturity of MFIs (dependent variable: FFB) 
Variable Model 27 Model 28 Model 29    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS 0.163**                  
 (0.071)                  
OSS*lnMaturity -0.024*                  
 (0.014)                  
ROA  0.042***                 
  (0.015)                 
ROA*lnMaturity  -0.060                 
  (0.084)                 
PM   0.038*** 
   (0.005)    
PM*lnMaturity   -0.060*** 
   (0.014)    
Regulated -0.204*** -0.203*** -0.215*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.011)    
lnSize -0.012** 0.007** -0.004    
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)    
lnMaturity 0.001 0.019 0.057*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.013)    
Bank 0.160*** 0.251*** 0.260*** 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.037)    
CUC 0.151*** 0.331*** 0.285*** 
 (0.029) (0.067) (0.067)    
NBFI 0.346*** 0.399*** 0.409*** 
 (0.033) (0.024) (0.031)    
NGO 0.425*** 0.484*** 0.502*** 
 (0.046) (0.008) (0.015)    
Network 0.484*** 0.576*** 0.628*** 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.037)    
Inflation 0.030** 0.063*** 0.063*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)    
GDP 0.021*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
SSA 0.040 0.068** 0.071***  
 (0.042) (0.029) (0.026)    
EAP 0.185*** 0.243*** 0.280*** 
 (0.047) (0.072) (0.067)    
EECA -0.317*** -0.262*** -0.244*** 
 (0.052) (0.066) (0.068)    
MENA -0.276*** -0.224*** -0.219*** 




Table D-10 (Continued) 
Variable Model 27 Model 28 Model 29    
Constant 0.335* -0.220 -0.222    
 (0.179) (0.142) (0.156)    
    
R-squared 0.548 0.601 0.595    
Observation 265.000 226.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 





Estimations of the mission drift and the types of MFIs (dependent variable: GNIALS) 
Variable Model 30 Model 31 Model 32   
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS -0.316                  
 (0.497)                  
OSS*Bank -1.583***                  
 (0.327)                  
OSS*CUC -0.586                  
 (0.684)                  
OSS*NBFI -0.320                  
 (0.568)                  
OSS*NGO 0.207                  
 (0.488)                  
ROA  -0.649                 
  (0.771)                 
ROA*Bank  -5.815***                 
  (0.850)                 
ROA*CUC  -4.381                 
  (3.780)                 
ROA*NBFI  -3.937***                 
  (1.194)                 
ROA*NGO  0.784                 
  (1.130)                 
PM   -0.105    
   (0.186)    
PM*Bank   -1.810*** 
   (0.283)    
PM*CUC   -0.877*    
   (0.447)    
PM*NBFI   -0.442*    
   (0.223)    
PM*NGO   0.188    
   (0.243)    
Regulated 0.059** 0.070* 0.063    
 (0.022) (0.037) (0.051)    
lnSize 0.070*** 0.092*** 0.087*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)    
lnMaturity 0.181*** 0.074** 0.092***  
 (0.055) (0.030) (0.027)    
Bank 0.590*** 0.716*** 0.857*** 
 (0.219) (0.120) (0.098)    
CUC 0.868* 1.194*** 1.203*** 




Table D-11 (Continued) 
Variable Model 30 Model 31 Model 32   
NBFI 0.215 0.344*** 0.259*** 
 (0.228) (0.110) (0.063)    
NGO -0.473*** -0.495*** -0.483*** 
 (0.162) (0.050) (0.054)    
Network 0.409** 0.543*** 0.432**   
 (0.167) (0.195) (0.168)    
Inflation 0.033*** 0.226*** 0.205*** 
 (0.008) (0.034) (0.038)    
GDP 0.074*** 0.278*** 0.270*** 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.034)    
SSA -0.441*** -0.365*** -0.388*** 
 (0.052) (0.097) (0.083)    
EAP -0.647*** -0.601*** -0.708*** 
 (0.048) (0.129) (0.085)    
EECA 0.134** 0.210*** 0.185*** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.053)    
MENA 0.192*** 0.221*** 0.195*** 
 (0.067) (0.043) (0.047)    
Constant 1.026 -2.655*** -2.467*** 
 (2.544) (0.433) (0.353)    
    
R-squared 0.435 0.448 0.443    
Observation 285.000 265.000 265.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 





Estimations of the mission drift and the types of MFIs (dependent variable: FFB) 
Variable Model 33 Model 34 Model 35    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS 0.207                  
 (0.220)                  
OSS*Bank 0.242                  
 (0.292)                  
OSS*CUC 0.158                  
 (0.341)                  
OSS*NBFI -0.155                  
 (0.166)                  
OSS*NGO -0.203                  
 (0.180)                  
ROA  0.004  
  (0.016)  
ROA*Bank  3.913***  
  (0.779)  
ROA*CUC  1.132  
  (0.917)  
ROA*NBFI  1.697**  
  (0.730)  
ROA*NGO  -0.448*  
  (0.264)  
PM   0.020    
   (0.016)    
PM*Bank   0.084    
   (0.198)    
PM*CUC   0.412**   
   (0.168)    
PM*NBFI   0.017    
   (0.246)    
PM*NGO   -0.227***  
   (0.082)    
Regulated -0.279*** -0.237*** -0.217*** 
 (0.037) (0.014) (0.013)    
lnSize -0.034*** 0.003 -0.006    
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.006)    
lnMaturity 0.003 0.013 0.049***  
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.014)    
Bank 0.004 0.118*** 0.255***  
 (0.085) (0.035) (0.077)    
CUC 0.134 0.332*** 0.224**   




Table D-12 (Continued) 
Variable Model 33 Model 34 Model 35    
NBFI 0.461*** 0.323*** 0.417*** 
 (0.039) (0.063) (0.085)    
NGO 0.695*** 0.529*** 0.556*** 
 (0.040) (0.026) (0.039)    
Network 0.648*** 0.629*** 0.588*** 
 (0.087) (0.046) (0.047)    
Inflation 0.026*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 
 (0.003) (0.018) (0.014)    
GDP -0.017** 0.036*** 0.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)    
SSA 0.359*** -0.010 0.091***  
 (0.057) (0.046) (0.030)    
EAP 0.493*** 0.216** 0.276*** 
 (0.092) (0.085) (0.067)    
EECA -0.367*** -0.268*** -0.247*** 
 (0.096) (0.071) (0.070)    
MENA -0.323*** -0.239*** -0.216*** 
 (0.059) (0.049) (0.040)    
Constant -0.898 -0.284 -0.202    
 (0.754) (0.170) (0.173)    
    
R-squared 0.387 0.622 0.600    
Observation 285.000 226.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 




Estimations of the mission drift and network membership (dependent variable: GNIALS) 
Variable Model 36 Model 37 Model 38    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS -1.032**                  
 (0.487)                  
OSS*Network 0.143                  
 (0.299)                  
ROA  -0.361***                 
  (0.060)                 
ROA*Network  0.847                 
  (1.268)                 
PM   -0.222*** 
   (0.055)    
PM*Network   0.010    
   (0.294)    
Regulated 0.090*** 0.130*** 0.127**   
 (0.030) (0.039) (0.057)    
lnSize 0.049*** 0.003 0.043*    
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.022)    
lnMaturity 0.132** 0.017 -0.059**   
 (0.053) (0.028) (0.027)    
Bank 0.777*** 0.475*** 0.462*** 
 (0.127) (0.179) (0.114)    
CUC 1.096*** 0.391 0.751**   
 (0.237) (0.436) (0.313)    
NBFI 0.315** 0.222 0.127*    
 (0.126) (0.144) (0.066)    
NGO -0.302* -0.452*** -0.508*** 
 (0.152) (0.129) (0.146)    
Network 0.457*** 0.125 0.126    
 (0.101) (0.170) (0.083)    
Inflation 0.179*** 0.138*** 0.188***  
 (0.017) (0.047) (0.070)    
GDP 0.083*** 0.066*** 0.240*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.026)    
SSA -0.372*** -0.134** -0.250*** 
 (0.035) (0.062) (0.036)    
EAP -0.698*** -0.759*** -0.904*** 
 (0.054) (0.094) (0.135)    
EECA 0.118* -0.016 -0.029    
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.041)    
MENA 0.278*** 0.220** 0.138    




Table D-13 (Continued) 
Variable Model 36 Model 37 Model 38    
Constant -1.987*** -1.447** -1.186**   
 (0.493) (0.674) (0.578)    
    
R-squared 0.414 0.452 0.401    
Observation 275.000 235.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 





Estimations of the mission drift and network membership (dependent variable: FFB) 
Variable Model 39 Model 40 Model 41    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS 0.419**                  
 (0.197)                  
OSS*Network -0.299**                  
 (0.145)                  
ROA  0.016                 
  (0.017)                 
ROA*Network  0.457                 
  (0.401)                 
PM   0.042***  
   (0.013)    
PM*Network   -0.203*    
   (0.102)    
Regulated -0.202*** -0.200*** -0.215*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)    
lnSize -0.013*** 0.004* -0.004    
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)    
lnMaturity -0.025*** 0.003 0.044***  
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.014)    
Bank 0.105*** 0.164*** 0.256*** 
 (0.026) (0.045) (0.038)    
CUC 0.109*** 0.198** 0.288*** 
 (0.012) (0.094) (0.072)    
NBFI 0.301*** 0.304*** 0.408*** 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.031)    
NGO 0.386*** 0.405*** 0.502*** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.017)    
Network 0.497*** 0.524*** 0.645*** 
 (0.032) (0.065) (0.055)    
Inflation 0.011*** 0.053*** 0.064*** 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.013)    
GDP -0.003 -0.000 0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)    
SSA 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.073***  
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.026)    
EAP 0.210*** 0.240*** 0.281*** 
 (0.035) (0.051) (0.061)    
EECA -0.304*** -0.265*** -0.243*** 
 (0.032) (0.052) (0.065)    
MENA -0.281*** -0.260*** -0.216*** 




Table D-14 (Continued) 
Variable Model 39 Model 40 Model 41    
Constant 0.713*** -0.020 -0.200    
 (0.191) (0.103) (0.165)    
    
R-squared 0.538 0.576 0.595    
Observation 285.000 235.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 





Estimations of the mission drift and inflation rate (dependent variable: GNIALS) 
Variable Model 42 Model 43 Model 44    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS -0.641***                  
 (0.213)                  
OSS*Inflation 0.003                  
 (0.012)                  
ROA  -0.293***                 
  (0.093)                 
ROA*Inflation  -0.457***                 
  (0.085)                 
PM   -0.182**   
   (0.081)    
PM*Inflation   -0.135*** 
   (0.018)    
Regulated 0.081 0.509*** 0.528*** 
 (0.060) (0.092) (0.118)    
lnSize 0.050*** -0.054* -0.016    
 (0.009) (0.032) (0.020)    
lnMaturity 0.111*** -0.187*** -0.243*** 
 (0.028) (0.058) (0.063)    
Bank 0.814*** -0.405*** -0.317*    
 (0.079) (0.150) (0.167)    
CUC 1.172*** -0.372 -0.005    
 (0.136) (0.429) (0.308)    
NBFI 0.282*** -0.853*** -0.843*** 
 (0.079) (0.095) (0.100)    
NGO -0.276 -1.578*** -1.564*** 
 (0.186) (0.215) (0.227)    
Network 0.544*** -2.065*** -2.204*** 
 (0.091) (0.171) (0.169)    
Inflation 0.209*** 0.145 0.156    
 (0.073) (0.127) (0.113)    
GDP 0.281*** 0.311*** 0.332*** 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.049)    
SSA -0.344*** -0.155* -0.266***  
 (0.045) (0.078) (0.097)    
EAP -0.684*** -2.676*** -2.884*** 
 (0.097) (0.287) (0.244)    
EECA 0.166*** -0.040 -0.120*** 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.021)    
MENA 0.224*** -0.046 -0.104    




Table D-15 (Continued) 
Variable Model 42 Model 43 Model 44    
Constant -1.357*** 1.647*** 1.857*** 
 (0.440) (0.211) (0.231)    
    
R-squared 0.426 0.613 0.574    
Observation 265.000 226.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 





Estimations of the mission drift and inflation rate (dependent variable: FFB) 
Variable Model 45 Model 46 Model 47    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS 0.026                  
 (0.093)                  
OSS*Inflation 0.037                  
 (0.065)                  
ROA  0.019                 
  (0.012)                 
ROA*Inflation  0.088***                 
  (0.026)                 
PM   0.003    
   (0.010)    
PM*Inflation   0.016***  
   (0.005)    
Regulated -0.205*** -0.212*** -0.223*** 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.011)    
lnSize -0.009 0.009*** -0.003    
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)    
lnMaturity -0.029*** 0.012 0.038**   
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.016)    
Bank 0.138*** 0.232*** 0.250*** 
 (0.033) (0.023) (0.031)    
CUC 0.171*** 0.308*** 0.268*** 
 (0.025) (0.060) (0.060)    
NBFI 0.358*** 0.388*** 0.404*** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.029)    
NGO 0.416*** 0.466*** 0.489*** 
 (0.046) (0.006) (0.013)    
Network 0.491*** 0.556*** 0.602*** 
 (0.026) (0.012) (0.032)    
Inflation 0.011*** 0.042** 0.047**   
 (0.002) (0.019) (0.018)    
GDP 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)    
SSA 0.050** 0.047 0.060**   
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.027)    
EAP 0.190*** 0.230*** 0.271*** 
 (0.048) (0.072) (0.063)    
EECA -0.313*** -0.268*** -0.247*** 
 (0.043) (0.062) (0.062)    
MENA -0.258*** -0.241*** -0.230*** 




Table D-16 (Continued) 
Variable Model 45 Model 46 Model 47    
Constant 0.238 -0.259* -0.243*    
 (0.224) (0.133) (0.137)    
    
R-squared 0.547 0.604 0.595    
Observation 275.000 226.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 






Estimations of the mission drift and GDP growth rate (dependent variable: GNIALS) 
Variable Model 48 Model 49 Model 50    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS -1.635***                  
 (0.254)                  
OSS*GDP 0.113***                  
 (0.014)                  
ROA  -0.400***                 
  (0.142)                 
ROA*GDP  0.084                 
  (0.423)                 
PM   -0.413***  
   (0.123)    
PM*GDP   0.195***  
   (0.072)    
Regulated 0.278*** 0.454*** 0.402*** 
 (0.079) (0.096) (0.107)    
lnSize 0.015*** -0.046 -0.006    
 (0.005) (0.028) (0.017)    
lnMaturity 0.064 -0.197*** -0.257*** 
 (0.045) (0.056) (0.065)    
Bank 0.789*** -0.458* -0.102    
 (0.183) (0.240) (0.200)    
CUC 1.224*** -0.458 0.141    
 (0.186) (0.338) (0.366)    
NBFI 0.057 -0.876*** -0.642*** 
 (0.188) (0.204) (0.154)    
NGO -0.526* -1.631*** -1.383*** 
 (0.305) (0.350) (0.272)    
Network -1.511*** -2.133*** -2.239*** 
 (0.138) (0.103) (0.082)    
Inflation 0.064 0.032 0.013    
 (0.046) (0.111) (0.101)    
GDP 0.053** 0.297*** 0.248*** 
 (0.022) (0.038) (0.032)    
SSA -0.383*** -0.264*** -0.348*** 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.078)    
EAP -2.371*** -2.728*** -2.857*** 
 (0.116) (0.274) (0.253)    
EECA 0.267*** -0.066** -0.097*    
 (0.077) (0.030) (0.058)    
MENA 0.086 -0.130 -0.144    




Table D-17 (Continued) 
Variable Model 48 Model 49 Model 50    
Constant -0.869** 1.406*** 1.234***  
 (0.433) (0.398) (0.447)    
    
R-squared 0.592 0.608 0.573    
Observation 265.000 226.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 






Estimations of the mission drift and GDP growth rate (dependent variable: FFB) 
Variable Model 51 Model 52 Model 53    
 b/se b/se b/se    
    
OSS 0.150***                  
 (0.029)                  
OSS*GDP -0.013***                  
 (0.004)                  
ROA  0.047***                 
  (0.017)                 
ROA*GDP  -0.071                 
  (0.069)                 
PM   0.061*** 
   (0.010)    
PM*GDP   -0.072*** 
   (0.008)    
Regulated -0.186*** -0.200*** -0.204*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)    
lnSize -0.011** 0.007** -0.004    
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)    
lnMaturity -0.039*** 0.014 0.041**   
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.017)    
Bank 0.080*** 0.236*** 0.202*** 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.041)    
CUC 0.082*** 0.318*** 0.242***  
 (0.024) (0.068) (0.075)    
NBFI 0.278*** 0.387*** 0.356*** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.036)    
NGO 0.344*** 0.470*** 0.448*** 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.023)    
Network 0.457*** 0.575*** 0.628*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.040)    
Inflation 0.036** 0.065*** 0.070*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)    
GDP 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.052*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)    
SSA 0.026 0.069** 0.068**   
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.026)    
EAP 0.160*** 0.243*** 0.273*** 
 (0.036) (0.072) (0.065)    
EECA -0.331*** -0.263*** -0.247*** 
 (0.049) (0.067) (0.069)    
MENA -0.292*** -0.224*** -0.220*** 




Table D-18 (Continued) 
Variable Model 51 Model 52 Model 53    
Constant 0.469*** -0.177 -0.103    
 (0.120) (0.141) (0.146)    
    
R-squared 0.553 0.601 0.601    
Observation 265.000 226.000 229.000    
Note: Total asset and MFI-age are in natural logarithmic form. Standard Errors are given 
in the parentheses. Statistically significant where * p<0.10; ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
 
